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A standard characterization of monetary policy is that the central bank follows a rule
in which the interest rate
￿
￿ responds more than one-for-one to deviations of the inﬂa-
tion rate
 
￿ from its target
 
￿. This is sometimes called the “Taylor principle,” and it
implies that when inﬂation is too high the monetary authorities raise real interest rates.
1
This is a natural monetary policy principle, since higher real interest rates discourage
consumption and investment and this puts downward pressure on the inﬂation rate.
As is now widely recognized, the zero lower bound on nominal net interest rates
has the potential to generate a “liquidity trap” with possibly major implications for
economic performance. One way to view the problem is that under weak additional
assumptions such a policy rule will entail a second steady state at a lower inﬂation rate.
The reason for this can be seen in Figure 1.






 , since in many baseline

















  represents a “global” interest rate rule, giving the response
of the gross nominal interest rate
￿ to the inﬂation factor
 
￿. At the target inﬂation
factor
 
￿, the slope is assumed to be larger than
 
￿
￿. This is the discrete time analog
of the Taylor principle that net interest rates respond more than one-for-one to changes
in net inﬂation rates (Taylor [1993] recommended a coefﬁcient of 1.5). The dashed
horizontal line indicates the zero lower bound, which constrains
￿ to be at least one
(i.e., the net interest rate
￿
￿
￿ to be nonnegative). Continuity of the Taylor rule implies
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represent deﬂation. Depending on the value of




 ,t h e
value of
 
￿ may be at positive or negative net rates of inﬂation.
2
The multiple equilibrium issue was emphasized, in particular, by Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001b), who showed that under perfect foresight (or
rational expectations [RE]) this second, unintended, low-inﬂation steady state not only
necessarily exists but also would possess a multiplicity of paths converging to it. This
has been interpreted as implying a signiﬁcant risk that the economy might follow
one of these “liquidity trap” paths. However, the analysis of convergence of paths to
the low-inﬂation steady state
 
￿ relies heavily on perfect foresight (or, in stochastic
versions, on RE).
There is a substantial literature that has discussed the plausibility of the economy
becoming trapped in a deﬂationary state, and what macroeconomic policies would be
able to avoid or extricate the economy from a liquidity trap.
3 The view in Evans, Guse,
and Honkapohja (2007), as well as in the earlier paper Evans and Honkapohja (2005), is
that the evolution of expectations plays a key role in the dynamics of the economy and
1. Taylor (1993) suggested that an appropriate coefﬁcient was 1.5. He also suggested that
￿
￿ should respond to the
output gap.
2. In our numerical illustrations, in Section VII,
￿
￿ corresponds to a deﬂation rate of about 2.5 percent per annum.
3. See Krugman (1998) for a recent seminal discussion and Adam and Billi (2007), Coenen, Orphanides, and
Wieland (2004), and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) for representative recent analyses and further
references. Braun and Waki (2006) provide a calibrated model for Japan that incorporates the zero interest
rate lower bound.
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Figure 1 Multiple Steady States with the Global Taylor Rule
that the tools from learning theory are needed for a comprehensive analysis of these
issues. In this report, I outline the reasons for this perspective, the main theoretical
results that emerge and the implications for monetary and ﬁscal policy.
The importance of expectations in the liquidity trap is now widely accepted. It
is implicit in the perfect foresight analysis of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe
(2001a, b), and in the Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) emphasis on the importance of
policy commitment for inﬂuencing expectations under the RE assumption. The learning
perspective alters both the assessment of the plausibility of particular dynamics and the
impact of policy.
Under learning, private agents are assumed to form expectations using an adaptive
forecasting rule, which they update over time in accordance with standard statistical
procedures. In many standard setups, least-squares learning is known to converge
asymptotically to RE, but cases of instability can also arise. In Evans and Honkapohja
(2005), we examined a ﬂexible price model with a global Taylor rule. We found that
while the intended steady state
 
￿ was locally stable under learning, the low-inﬂation
steady state
 
￿ was not locally stable,
4 and there was also the possibility under learning
of inﬂation slipping below
 
￿. In that paper, we showed that switching to a sufﬁciently
aggressive monetary policy at an appropriate inﬂation threshold could avoid these
unstable trajectories. In contrast, ﬁscal policy in these circumstances was ineffective.
4. See also McCallum (2002) for an argument that the low-inﬂation steady state is not stable under learning. In
contrast to these ﬁndings, Bullard and Cho (2005) show, within a (linearized) New Keynesian model, that there
are “escape paths” toward a low nominal interest rate, low inﬂation rate outcome. Thus, the targeted equilibrium
of the monetary authority is locally stable under least-squares learning, but escapes can occur under constant
gain learning.
61The analysis of Evans and Honkapohja (2005), however, was conducted in a
ﬂexible-price model with exogenous output. In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007),
and in other work in progress, we employ a New Keynesian model to reexamine these
issues in an economy in which output can deviate from the ﬂexible-price equilibrium.
5
This approach leads to a number of striking results. The possibility of liquidity
traps, that is, net interest rates near zero, combined with deﬂation and falling output,
emerges as a serious concern. Although the targeted steady state is locally stable under
learning, a large pessimistic shock to expectations can result, under learning, in a self-
reinforcing process in which inﬂation falls over time, eventually leading to deﬂation
and a declining consumption path. Unstable paths of this type will be referred to as a
“deﬂationary spiral.” We consider a number of policies to insulate the economy from
this outcome. Each of these policies maintains the Taylor rule over most of the range
but switches to aggressive policies if inﬂation or output falls below some threshold.
We ﬁrst consider an inﬂation threshold policy in which aggressive monetary policy
is used whenever inﬂation falls below, or threatens to fall below, some speciﬁed thresh-
old. It turns out that this policy, although it does offer some protection, is not sufﬁcient
if the negative expectations shock is very large. Next, we augment the preceding pol-
icy by adding aggressive ﬁscal policy if monetary policy alone is inadequate to keep
inﬂation at or above the threshold. We demonstrate that this combination of aggressive
policies with a threshold chosen at a suitable level can always eliminate the possibility
of deﬂationary spirals and ensure global stability of the targeted steady state. This is the
central policy ﬁnding that emerges from the adaptive learning perspective.
Our central policy result leads to several further questions. One natural question
is whether an output threshold could be substituted for an inﬂation threshold. Surpris-
ingly, the answer is no: using an output threshold to trigger aggressive monetary and
ﬁscal policies will not necessarily avoid deﬂationary spirals. Another question concerns
the timing for implementing our recommended policy in which normal monetary and
ﬁscal policy is augmented by inﬂation threshold policies. Using simulations, we show
that it is better to adopt inﬂation threshold policies earlier rather than later. Ideally,
our inﬂation threshold policy is in place before substantial negative expectation shocks
impact the economy.
II. The Model
We adopt a fairly standard representative agent model along the lines of Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001b, section 3), except that we allow for stochastic
shocks and conduct the analysis in discrete time.
6 There is a continuum of household-
ﬁrms units, which produce a differentiated consumption good under conditions of
5. Our analysis provides a theoretical framework for the potential role of ﬁscal policy in combating liquidity traps,
which has been a controversial topic in the empirical literature on Japan’s slump. See Ball (2005), Kuttner and
Posen (2002), and Perri (2001).
6. We develop our analysis within a closed-economy model. For discussions of liquidity traps in open economies,
see, for example, McCallum (2000) and Svensson (2003).
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monopolistic competition and price adjustment costs. We allow for both ﬁscal and
monetary policy and for the government to issue debt.
A. Private Sector
The objective for agent
￿ is to maximize expected, discounted utility subject to a stan-

































































































































￿ denotes real bonds




















￿ is output of good
￿,
￿














































































The ﬁnal term parameterizes the cost of adjusting prices in the spirit of
Rotemberg (1982).


















￿. Output is differentiated, and ﬁrms operate under monopolistic com-
































  is the elasticity of substitution between two goods and is assumed to
be greater than one.
B. Fiscal and Monetary Policy





































￿ denotes government consumption of the aggregate good and
 
￿ is the lump-




























￿, ﬁscal policy is “passive” in
















￿ is an observable exogenous stationary AR
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  is taken to be non-negative and non-decreasing, while
 
￿ is an ex-
ogenous, stationary positive AR
 
￿
  shock with mean 1, representing random shifts in
the behavior of the monetary policymaker.

























￿ can be viewed as the inﬂation target of the





































￿, which we assume is bigger than
 
￿
￿. Thus, the “Taylor principle” holds locally
at the target steady state
 
￿ and Figure 1 depicts the global monetary policy rule.
Equations (4), (5), and (7), with ﬁscal policy passive and the Taylor principle satis-
ﬁed at
 
￿, constitute what we call “normal policy.” We focus on this policy benchmark
because interest rate rules satisfying the Taylor principle at the target inﬂation rate ap-
pear to be a good description of actual monetary policy in many countries, and because
this form of monetary policy in combination with passive ﬁscal policy is widely be-
lieved to have desirable properties. As we will see, normal policy does lead to a locally
unique solution that is stable under learning.
9 Our concern is with the global stability
properties of the “normal” or “benchmark” policies under learning.










￿, then under RE there are no non-explosive solutions.
8. For simplicity, we only include monetary and ﬁscal random shocks. However, it would be straightforward also
to allow, for example, for productivity and taste shocks.
9. Bullard and Mitra (2002) study determinacy and stability under learning in linearized New Keynesian models,
for different forms of interest rate rules. Evans and Honkapohja (2007) study determinacy and stability under
learning in linearized ﬂexible-price models, for different monetary and ﬁscal regimes.
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In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we examine the system under normal policy. Later
we consider modiﬁcations to normal policy when inﬂation or output falls below some
stated threshold.
C. Key Equations































































































































to which we add the equations (3)–(7).
Consider ﬁrst the nonstochastic steady states in the absence of random shocks. For
any steady state














































 , there are no steady states other than
the intended steady state
 
￿ and the unintended low-inﬂation steady state
 
￿.
























































￿. For steady states
 
 
￿, there continue to
be unique values for
￿ and
￿ provided





Near each nonstochastic steady state, a corresponding stochastic steady state can
be shown to exist provided the support of the exogenous shocks is sufﬁciently small.
Furthermore, each steady state is locally determinate (locally unique), provided the
steady state of the corresponding linearized system is determinate. Numerically, these
results appear to carry over to the case of large shocks. Based on the linearization there




































where the coefﬁcients depend on the steady state in question. In Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2007), we show the following (for sufﬁciently small shocks):
10


















￿ is locally indeterminate.
Thus, while the
 
￿ steady state is locally unique, the
 






III. Learning and Expectational Stability
We now formally introduce learning to the model in place of the hypothesis that RE
prevails in all periods. In the current section, we study the system under learning when
normal monetary and ﬁscal policy are in place. We will see that normal policy usu-
ally performs well in the sense that the targeted steady state
 
￿ is locally stable under
learning: small or even moderate deviations of expectations from the RE values at the
intended steady state return over time, under learning, to the rational expectations equi-
librium (REE). However, the stability is not global: certain large shocks to expectations
lead to unstable trajectories.
In the modeling of learning, it is assumed that private agents make forecasts using
a reduced-form econometric model of the relevant variables and that the parameters
of this model are estimated using past data. The forecasts are the input to the agents’
decision rules and in each period the economy attains a temporary equilibrium, that
is, an equilibrium for the current-period variables given the forecasts of the agents.
The temporary equilibrium provides a new data point, which in the next period leads
to reestimation of the parameters and updating of the forecasts and, in turn, to a new
temporary equilibrium. The sequence of temporary equilibria may generate parameter
estimates that converge to a ﬁxed point corresponding to an REE for the economy, pro-
vided the form of the econometric model that agents use for forecasts is consistent with
the REE. When convergence takes place, we say that the REE is stable under learning.
This particular version of bounded rationality, that private agents, when making
forecasts, are modeled as econometricians, satisﬁes the “cognitive consistency” princi-
ple that we should model our economic agents as being about as smart as economists.
Economists do not know the exact stochastic process followed by the economy. When
we need to make forecasts, we do so using estimated models. When new forecasts are
required, we update our coefﬁcient estimates and use them to make the forecasts based
on our current information set. That is how the adaptive learning approach models how
economic agents make forecasts.
10. For proofs of propositions and other derivations, see Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007).
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The literature on adaptive learning has shown that there is a close connection be-
tween the possible convergence of least-squares learning to an REE and a stability con-
dition, known as E-stability, based on a mapping from the Perceived Law of Motion
(which private agents are estimating) to the implied Actual Law of Motion generating
the data under these perceptions. E-stability is deﬁned in terms of local stability, at an
REE, of a differential equation based on this map. For a general discussion of adaptive
learning and the E-stability principle, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).








processes, the appropriate forecast rule based on (14) is for private agents to estimate




























































The usual timing assumption made in the learning literature is that at the end of period
￿
￿
￿, agents estimate the parameters using data on all variables through time
￿
￿





























￿. Then, at the start of time
￿ agents





























































￿. Then, at the end of period
￿ the parameters are updated using the
extra data point, and the process continues.
It is now convenient to make a simpliﬁcation, which does not in any way affect our
key theoretical results. It turns out that the stability under learning of the two different
steady states is governed by stability of the intercepts, not by the coefﬁcients of the
























￿. This simpliﬁes the






￿. In the learning literature, this is often called “steady-state learning.”
Under steady-state learning, agents treat (14) as a Perceived Law of Motion and
for each variable they estimate simply the intercept or mean. We can thus identify ex-
pectations of the variables with the estimates of their means, and this has a simple
























































￿, often termed a “decreasing-gain” sequence, whereas









￿ is a small positive constant. Decreasing gains have the advantage that they
can asymptotically converge to RE, while constant-gain learning rules are more robust
to structural change.
In what follows, we analyze both theoretically and numerically the model under
various speciﬁcations of monetary and ﬁscal policy. The theoretical results for learn-
ing are based on E-stability analysis of the system under the learning rules (15)–(16).




￿ is stable (or unstable) under learning, this
















￿ (or not) as
￿
￿
￿. In the simulations, we instead use a small
constant gain. Under small constant gain, when an equilibrium is E-stable there is local
convergence of learning in a weaker sense to a random variable that is centered near
and tightly distributed around the equilibrium.
11
In studying the economy under learning, we return to the nonlinear model so that
we can examine the global dynamics of the system. In doing so, it is convenient to make

































￿. This allows us to deal directly with expectations of
future consumption and inﬂation rather than with expectations of nonlinear functions of
these quantities, and this is anyway a plausible assumption under bounded rationality.
Using also the production function to substitute out
￿

































































































￿. These equations, together with the interest rate rule (7), implicitly






































































where it follows from the implicit function theorem that such a map exists in a
neighborhood of each steady state (the linearization was given above as [14]).
11. For formal details, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, section 7.4).
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￿ under learning is then given by (17)–(18)
and (7) together with (15)–(16). The full dynamic system under learning augments












































and the bond equation (3).
The stability of a steady-state REE under learning is determined by E-stability. The











































































































































￿ is locally stable under learning




￿ is locally unstable under learning, taking the form of
a saddle point.
The saddle point property of
 
￿ creates a region in which there can be deﬂationary
spirals. We illustrate this using a numerically constructed phase diagram. This also
allows us to examine larger
 
 


















































￿. Figure 2 shows the E-stability dynamics under normal monetary and
ﬁscal policy. These indicate how, under learning, expectations will on average adjust
over time when the economy is perturbed from its steady-state equilibrium. It can be
seen that while the
 








￿ is a saddle.
 
￿ is therefore locally unstable under learning.
What might cause deviations of expectations from equilibrium values? Under
constant-gain learning, although expectations remain centered in mean around REE
values, there are continual deviations as coefﬁcients are updated to recent data that re-
main subject to random shocks. Provided the system remains in the stability region,
learning dynamics will tend to return the system to the stable REE
 
￿.H o w e v e r ,t h e r e
is always the possibility that a particular, relatively unlikely, sequence of shocks pushes
expectations over time sufﬁciently far from equilibrium to “escape” from the region of
local stability. Furthermore, in actual economies, there is also the possibility of a major
shock to expectations, arising from unexpected and possibly unmodeled events, that are
rightly or wrongly perceived by economic agents to require a substantial revision in
69their expectations of the future course of the economy. We have in mind, for example, a
large decline in optimism following a substantial decline in equity or other asset prices,
which in turn could have been triggered by various precipitating events.
The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the dividing line between the regions of stability
and instability. Under learning, normal policy works satisfactorily for moderate-sized
perturbations from the targeted steady state
 
￿: any initial position above and to the
right of the dashed line leads to expectation paths, under the mean learning dynamics,
that return to the
 
￿ REE. However, there are also starting points that lead to instability.
In particular, if an exogenous shock leads to a strong downward revision of expecta-
tions, relative to the normal steady state, these pessimistic expectations can generate
paths leading to a deﬂationary spiral. This is illustrated by point A, which is inside the









steadily over time, and although
￿
￿ initially rises, eventually it too declines over time
along the deﬂationary spiral path indicated in the ﬁgure.




￿ are below the values corresponding to the
targeted steady state
 
￿, it can be seen that a sufﬁciently large negative shock either
to inﬂation expectations, or to consumer expectations, can put the economy into the
unstable region.
The intuition for the instability of the low steady state
 
￿ is as follows. Near
 
￿





￿ Dynamics under Normal Policy
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￿ is slightly below
 
￿, this must
therefore lead to an increase in the real interest rate, to lower
￿
￿ through the household
Euler equation and to lower
 
￿ through the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This sets in




￿, which are reinforced as they feed into
expectations. Of course, along these paths it is likely that something would eventually
change, in other words, private agents or policymakers would alter their reactions. We
think the most plausible scenario is that policymakers would respond to the deteriorat-
ing situation with major changes in policy. The goals of this paper are, ﬁrst, to show
that normal policies, while locally stable, have the potential for instability after major
expectational shocks and, second, to propose policies that move the economy out of a
deﬂationary spiral as well as to insulate the economy against these unstable outcomes.
The results of this section indicate the need for more aggressive policies when ex-
pectations are overly pessimistic. We begin by considering changing to an aggressive
monetary policy when inﬂation threatens to become too low. As we will see, it may be
important also to alter ﬁscal policy in certain circumstances.
IV. Adding Aggressive Monetary Policy
We ﬁrst consider modifying monetary policy so that it follows the normal interest rate





 , but cuts interest rates to a low-level ﬂoor
￿
￿ if inﬂation threatens
to get below a threshold
￿

























































where we will think of
￿
￿ as very slightly more than 1.
12 The modiﬁed interest rate rule
is shown in Figure 3.
A policy question of major importance is whether an aggressive monetary policy
of this form is sufﬁcient to eliminate the possibility of deﬂationary spirals arising when
expectations are pessimistic. It can be shown that aggressive monetary policy will not
always be adequate to avoid these outcomes. We have the following result for policy in
which an inﬂation threshold
￿
  triggers aggressive monetary policy.
13
Incorporating aggressive monetary policy triggered by an inﬂation threshold
￿
 






￿, which is a saddle point
under learning.
We illustrate this point numerically using a phase diagram showing expectational









￿, so that net nominal interest rates are cut almost









￿.W es e t
￿
￿ above one to keep money demand ﬁnite under our
parameterization.
13. In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) we formally demonstrate this and subsequent results for low degrees














￿, for Aggressive Monetary Policy















spiral still exists for sufﬁciently pessimistic expectations. There are now two steady
states: the targeted steady state at
 










￿, which is a saddle with nearby deﬂationary paths.
The conclusion from this analysis is that aggressive monetary policy willnot always
be sufﬁcient to eliminate deﬂationary spirals and stagnation.
14 We therefore now take
up ﬁscal policy as a possible additional measure.
14. This contrasts with the ﬁndings of Evans and Honkapohja (2005). There we found for the ﬂexible-price case





￿, would render the
￿
￿
steady state globally stable.
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￿, for Aggressive Monetary Policy, but with
Normal Fiscal Policy
V. Combined Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now introduce our recommended policy to combat liquidity traps and deﬂationary
spirals. Normal monetary and ﬁscal policy is supplemented by an inﬂation threshold or







If this inﬂation threshold would not be achieved under normal policy, then mone-
tary and/or ﬁscal policy is adjusted to ensure that (19) holds. In Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2007), we demonstrate from the New Keynesian Phillips curve (17) that




















￿ sufﬁciently high. This implies that it is indeed possible for policy
to be designed to guarantee an inﬂation ﬂoor.
We now specify a policy based on this result. If the inﬂation threshold
￿
  is not
achieved under normal policy, then we ﬁrst abandon the Taylor-type interest rate rule,
and reduce
￿












￿ is not sufﬁcient,
then
￿
￿ is adjusted upward and is set equal to the minimum value such that the inﬂation
threshold is met. By the above result, this is feasible. Intuitively, if (19) would not
be satisﬁed under normal policy, the ﬁrst priority is to relax monetary policy to the
extent required to achieve it. If the zero net interest rate lower bound renders monetary
73policy inadequate to the task, then aggressive ﬁscal policy is deployed. For the policy











￿. We have the following result:
Consider policy that incorporates aggressive monetary and ﬁscal policy triggered










￿.T h e n
 
￿ is the unique steady state.
We have thus eliminated all steady states other than the one intended by policy-
makers. How is this possible, in view of Figures 1 and 3, which seem to render
inevitable the existence of a second low-inﬂation steady state? Under the policy rec-
ommended in the present section, the interest factor
￿
￿ continues to be set according








  triggers aggressive monetary and ﬁscal policies, and





 , however pessimistic expectations may





  are no longer realizable. Consequently, low-inﬂation
steady states no longer exist.
Based on earlier results, we know that the stochastic steady state at
 
￿ is locally
determinate and locally stable under learning. In fact, numerical computations indi-
cate that the
 
￿ equilibrium is now globally unique and globally stable under learning.









￿, so that when aggressive mone-
tary policy is triggered the nominal interest rate is cut almost all the way to the zero
lower bound, if required, as discussed in the previous section. (Other parameters are as










￿, for Aggressive Monetary Policy and,
If Needed, Aggressive Fiscal Policy
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￿. There is now a unique steady state at
 
￿
and it is evident from the ﬁgure that it is globally stable.
Our main ﬁnding is that a combination of aggressive monetary and ﬁscal policy
to maintain a sufﬁciently high lower bound on inﬂation will eliminate the possibility










￿ steady state, but





  is achievable by bringing in aggressive ﬁscal policy, if necessary, to supplement
aggressive monetary policy. Having set the policy to ensure this inﬂation threshold, we
simultaneously ensure that the system is restricted to a region in which there are stable
learning dynamics.
VI. An Output Threshold for Policy?
The preceding discussion naturally raises the question whether another type of thresh-
old might be used for triggering aggressive policies. Consider in particular the possi-









￿ by ﬁrst dropping interest rates as needed to ensure the threshold,






￿ is not sufﬁcient to meet
the output threshold, then also
￿






policy is analogous to the one recommended in Section V, except that we now have a
minimum output threshold instead of an inﬂation threshold.
Surprisingly, it turns out that this form of policy does not always eliminate deﬂa-
tionary spirals. There is again the possibility of an unintended steady state, which is a
saddle under learning. The theoretical details are somewhat complicated, so I will just
give a numerical example and some intuition.















￿ percent of the high steady-state output (the other parameters are unchanged). In






￿ exists, which again is locally a saddle
under learning. Figure 6 shows that deﬂationary spirals exist at the bottom-left corner
of the phase diagram.
On these deﬂationary spiral paths, consumption falls steadily after a certain point.
Output is then sustained by ever-increasing government spending. The intuition is that





￿,t h eex ante
real interest rate increases, which depresses private consumption. Simply maintaining
output is not enough. To put a ﬂoor on consumption, it is critical to put an upper bound
on real interest rates, and this can only be done by stabilizing inﬂation. One might think
that stabilizing output at a high-enough level is enough to stabilize
 
￿, but this is not
the case. In the temporary equilibrium Phillips curve (17),
 













￿ depends negatively on the





￿ is maintained by increasing
￿
￿
in the face of falling
￿
￿, inﬂation will continue to fall because households/ﬁrms become
more willing to reduce prices as the marginal utility of consumption rises.







We now illustrate our recommended policy using real-time stochastic simulations. We
here assume a constant-gain form of the learning rule with a small gain. Simulations
conﬁrm local convergence to the stable targeted steady state under normal policy
and global convergence under our recommended policy, in which normal policy is
augmented by aggressive monetary and ﬁscal policy if
 







It is beneﬁcial to have our recommended policies in place before a collapse in ex-
pectations. We illustrate how our policies work, in the face of pessimistic expectations,
if initially normal policies are used, and then our recommended policies are imple-
mented after some point
￿



























￿ percent per year. Other parameters are close to those used earlier.
15 For the
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Figure 7 Dynamics of
￿ and
￿
￿ after Pessimistic Expectations Shock
We consider the impact, under real-time learning, of a negative expectations shock.



































This is a substantial fall in consumption expectations, of just over 8 percent, combined
with a drop in inﬂation expectations. The magnitude of these expectation shocks, which
we treat as an exogenous pessimistic shift that is not rooted in fundamentals, turns out
to be just sufﬁcient to put the economy on a path toward a deﬂationary spiral under












￿, and we compare both to the outcomes

















￿, the ﬁgures show consumption diverging to low values before the aug-
mented policies are introduced. Inﬂation is on a steady downward trajectory when only
normal policy rules are in place. Introduction of the aggressive policies at
￿
￿ leads to a
recovery of inﬂation and consumption to the targeted steady-state values. It is seen that
interest rates fall to the ﬂoor level
￿
￿ and debt gradually rises under the normal policy
regime in which government spending is constant. At time
￿
￿
￿, when the augmented
policies are introduced, this leads to an increase in government spending and conse-
quently a further substantial increase in debt in a short interval in time. With the new
policy, government spending is gradually reduced as expectations of inﬂation and con-
sumption recover. This also allows debt to return gradually to the steady state. Interest
rates also return to normal levels and inﬂation converges toward
 
￿.
77Figure 8 Dynamics of
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Figure 9 Dynamics of
￿,
￿,a n d
￿ after Pessimistic Expectations Shock






￿ show that introduction of our policies at an earlier time
avoids the worst part of stagnation. Consumption does not fall as much and returns to
normal levels much earlier, and the debt level does not rise nearly as much. Finally,
if our policies are in place at the time of the expectations shocks, the impact of the





￿ in the face of the shocks, and consequently aggressive ﬁscal
policy is never required. These results clearly show that incorporation of an inﬂation
threshold policy can prevent the economy from sliding into a deﬂationary spiral and
can then greatly attenuate the impact of pessimistic expectations shocks.
However, monetary policy alone is not always sufﬁcient. Consider the economy
with everything the same except that the initial drop in
￿





show that these shocks are sufﬁciently large that they cannot be offset by monetary
policy even if interest rates are dropped immediately to the ﬂoor. Some use of ﬁscal





 . However, only a modest use
of ﬁscal policy is needed if the threshold policy is in place when the shocks occur. In
contrast, waiting to implement our recommended policies leads to lower consumption,
and greater use of ﬁscal policy with a larger (though temporary) buildup of debt.
Since the impact of aggressive monetary policy is limited by the zero lower bound,
one might expect that a higher inﬂation target
 
￿ would lead to a lower likelihood of
needing countercyclical ﬁscal policy. This turns out to be the case. Consider changing







￿ and suppose that the random shocks and other param-



















Suppose the initial drop in
￿





￿. Simulations show that in this case there is now no need for ﬁscal pol-
icy because there is greater room for aggressive monetary policy. Of course, although
a higher
 
￿ provides additional ﬂexibility for monetary policy, this must be set against
the greater inefﬁciency of having a higher steady-state inﬂation rate.
VIII. Further Discussion and Extensions
Our analysis raises a number of questions, some of which may lead to fruitful exten-
sions. I will brieﬂy discuss several of these points, and also return to the issue of how
the learning approach differs from an approach that simply assumes RE.
First, noting the critical role of ﬁscal policy in stabilizing inﬂation, one might ask
whether we could dispense entirely with aggressive monetary policy and simply resort
to aggressive ﬁscal policy whenever
 
￿ threatens to fall below
￿
 . While the answer is
yes, we think our recommended policy is clearly preferable, because there are good
reasons to treat monetary policy as the primary tool for countercyclical macroeconomic
policy. While we have not included an analysis of the beneﬁts of government spending,
itisreasonabletoassumethatitsmeanlevelshavebeensettobalancecostsandbeneﬁts.
If extensive government spending is used to guarantee the inﬂation threshold, then it is
likely that much of the spending will be wasteful in the sense that private consumption
would be more highly valued. We therefore prefer to use ﬁscal policy as a policy of last
resort to ensure the inﬂation threshold.
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ing? In our setup we have lump-sum taxes, and under RE Ricardian Equivalence holds.
Consequently, it is variations in
￿
￿, not in taxes, that must be used. Continuing with
this point, if the variations in
￿
￿ are balanced by equal changes in lump-sum taxes, then
the temporary debt buildup, which sometimes accompanied our recommended policy,
could be avoided. Our tax rule was merely set to ensure some target level of real debt
asymptotically. Of course, lump-sum taxes are unrealistic and a useful extension would
be to look at a model that includes tax distortions, to make sure that our recommended
policy continues to guarantee global stability in this setup. With distortionary taxes,
there is an efﬁciency advantage to tax rate smoothing, so one would again expect a
temporary buildup of debt whenever aggressive ﬁscal policy is required.
How does our approach compare with the policies for avoiding the liquidity trap
recommended by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002), based on a purely RE
approach?
16 Under RE/perfect foresight, the issue of concern is the existence of paths
converging to
 
￿. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002) argue that these paths
can be eliminated by altering tax policy, if inﬂation falls to a neighborhood of
 
￿,
so that real lump-sum taxes plus seigniorage are set equal to a negative coefﬁcient
times total real government liabilities
￿
￿
￿. Along an inﬂation path converging to
 
￿,
there would then be an explosive increase in total government liabilities, which would
lead to a violation of the household transversality condition. Because satisfaction of the
transversality condition is a necessary condition for a perfect foresight equilibrium, un-
der this ﬁscal policy neither the
 
￿ steady state nor paths to
 
￿ are possible equilibrium
outcomes. In effect, the government eliminates the liquidity trap paths by threatening
to implement unsustainable tax cuts at low inﬂation rates. Private agents are assumed
to recognize that the resulting time path could not be an equilibrium and consequently
coordinate instead on the intended equilibrium at
 
￿. This argument relies heavily, and
in my view implausibly, on the perfect foresight assumption.
From the adaptive learning perspective of the current paper, the results of such a



















￿. A switch to
the tax reduction policy, described in the previous paragraph, when inﬂation falls below
some threshold level, would not avert deﬂationary spiral paths of the type shown in
Figure 2, but would lead to these paths being accompanied by even larger increases
in debt.
The aggressive ﬁscal policy we propose relies on a different ﬁscal instrument,
namely, increases in government spending, and a different and more direct economic
mechanism. Government purchases directly affect the demand for goods and hence
raise the rate of inﬂation. Using aggressive ﬁscal policy, if necessary, to supplement ag-












With interest rates at or near the zero lower bound, the resulting low ex ante real interest




￿ and hence to a recovery of consumer spending. Eventually
16. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002) study nonstochastic continuous-time ﬂexible-price economies
under perfect foresight, but the same points could be made in our setup.
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this process lifts inﬂation above
￿
  and the inherent stable learning dynamics return the
economy to the intended steady state at
 
￿.
Under our proposed policy, the economy also behaves differently under learning
than it would under fully RE. With our policy in place, there is a unique steady-state
REE. Under RE, autonomous adverse shocks to expectations cannot occur. If they did
arise due to some unmodeled disturbance, expectations would return immediately to
their RE values. Under adaptive learning, however, this process plays out over time,
with expectation coefﬁcients updated in response to actual economic data.
Another issue concerns the potential role of commitment or announcements of fu-
ture policy changes. The RE literature, on the beneﬁts of commitment to a monetary
policy rule, stresses the impact of this commitment on expectations. One might wonder
whether this expectational channel is absent when RE is replaced by learning. This is
not the case. Commitment to an optimal policy rule can readily be handled within an
adaptive learning approach, as discussed by Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006) for
monetary policy in normal times. Since optimal policy with commitment includes his-
tory dependence, this alters the form of the REE. The history dependence introduced
into the economy by the central bank will be reﬂected in the form of the Perceived
Law of Motion used by private agents: the list of explanatory variables they use for
forecasting would be augmented to include, for example, lagged GDP. If the REE is
E-stable, then it is learnable using this augmented forecasting model. The general ori-
entation of the adaptive learning approach is that commitment to a speciﬁc policy rule
will affect private-agent expectations over time, as the variables and the parameters of
the forecasting model adapt statistically to observed outcomes. All the expectational
channels that are present under RE are available also under adaptive learning. However,
the learning approach extends and qualiﬁes the RE analysis, by examining local and
global stability of the REE under learning and by studying the potential for additional
learning dynamics.
Similar issues arise in connection with monetary policy when interest rates are at
or near the zero lower bound. In the RE analysis of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
and Braun and Waki (2006), commitment to a future period of zero net interest rates,
after the zero lower bound constraint ceases to bind, plays an important role. This
introduces a speciﬁc form of nonlinear history dependence through which monetary
policy affects expectations. In our analysis, we have purposely kept very simple the
class of policy rules studied, to provide a systematic analysis of global learning dy-
namics within the nonlinear structural model. Clearly, it would be of interest to extend
our learning analysis to examine more general interest rate rules incorporating various
forms of history dependence.
A related issue concerns the planning horizon assumed for our boundedly rational
agents. The approach we have adopted here is based on “Euler equation learning,” in




￿. This is a valid and convenient approach to modeling bounded rationality,
sincetheEulerequationsexpressnecessaryﬁrst-orderconditionsforoptimumdecision-
making. As Seppo Honkapohja and I have stressed elsewhere, Euler-equation learning
convergestoREequilibriainavarietyofcontexts,includingrealbusinesscyclemodels,
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interest rate rules. An alternative approach, stressed in Preston (2005), retains adaptive
learning, but asks agents each to forecast inﬁnitely far into the future and to re-solve
their dynamic optimization problem each period. Frequently, these approaches do not
come to signiﬁcantly different qualitative conclusions concerning stability.
17 Again, it
would be of interest to know whether any of our results are affected by the planning
horizon of private agents.
A ﬁnal issue worth pursuing concerns whether the inclusion of assets other than
money and bonds would affect the possibility of deﬂationary spirals or alter our main
policy conclusions. Extending our approach to include models with capital would cer-
tainly be desirable. In current work in progress, Eran Guse, Seppo Honkapohja, and
I have extended our analysis to an open-economy setting in which foreign assets can
be accumulated. This provides an additional exchange rate channel for monetary pol-
icy, and we are studying the implications of this for alternative policy rules under
private-agent learning.
IX. Conclusions
The recent theoretical literature on the zero lower bound to nominal interest rates has
emphasized the possibility of multiple equilibria and liquidity traps when monetary
policy is conducted using a global Taylor rule. Most of this literature has focused on
models with perfect foresight or fully RE. We take these issues very seriously, but our
ﬁndings for these models under adaptive learning are quite different and in some ways
much more alarming than suggested by the RE viewpoint. We have shown that under
standard monetary and ﬁscal policy, the steady-state equilibrium targeted by policy-
makers is locally stable. In normal times, these policies will appropriately stabilize
inﬂation, consumption, and output. However, the desired steady state is not globally
stable under normal policies. A sufﬁciently large pessimistic shock to expectations can
send the economy along an unstable deﬂationary spiral.
To avoid the possibility of deﬂation and stagnation, we recommend a combination
of aggressive monetary and ﬁscal policy triggered whenever inﬂation threatens to fall
below an appropriate threshold. Monetary policy should immediately reduce nominal
interest rates, as required, even (almost) to the zero net interest rate ﬂoor if needed,
and this should be augmented by ﬁscal policy, if necessary, in the form of increased
government purchases. Intriguingly, using an aggregate output threshold in the same
way will not always successfully reverse a deﬂationary spiral.
When aggressive ﬁscal policy is necessary, this will lead to a temporary buildup
of government debt. However, government spending and debt will gradually return to
their steady-state values. An earlier implementation of the recommended policies will
mitigate the use of government spending, and if our recommended policy is already in
place at the time of the shocks, the immediate use of aggressive monetary policy can in
17. One situation where the planning horizon is important is when private agents conﬁdently anticipate unique
future structural or policy changes that have not yet been implemented. How to treat this within an adaptive
learning framework is analyzed in Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2007).
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some (but not all) cases entirely avoid the need to use ﬁscal policy. Raising the inﬂation
target
 
￿ is an alternative way of reducing the likelihood of needing to employ ﬁscal
policy, but this may be undesirable for other reasons.
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